Investigation · Drug Policy Series

Portugal Didn't Collapse: 25 Years of Decriminalisation

In 2001, Portugal decriminalised the possession of all drugs for personal use. Politicians predicted catastrophe. Drug tourists, they said, would flood the country. Society would unravel. Twenty-five years later, the evidence is in — and the prohibitionists were wrong on every single count.

By xbard 30 min read

01 The Experiment

On 1 July 2001, Portugal did something no country had ever done before. It decriminalised the personal possession of all drugs — not just cannabis, but heroin, cocaine, MDMA, amphetamines, everything. The law, known as Lei n.º 30/2000, reclassified the possession of drugs for personal use from a criminal offence to an administrative one.[1]

The world watched in horror. Or rather, the world's politicians watched in horror. Drug policy experts watched with cautious optimism. And the prohibitionists — the professional scaremongers who had spent decades insisting that only criminal punishment stood between civilised society and total collapse — predicted catastrophe on an apocalyptic scale.

Drug tourism would flood Portugal, they said. Addicts from across Europe would descend on Lisbon. Drug use would explode. Children would be smoking heroin in schoolyards. Portugal would become a failed narco-state on the western edge of Europe.

“Twenty-five years later, none of it happened. Not one prediction of the prohibitionist camp proved correct. Portugal didn't collapse. It got healthier.”

The context matters. Portugal didn't decriminalise drugs because it was progressive. It decriminalised drugs because it was desperate. By the late 1990s, Portugal had the worst drug problem in Europe. An estimated 1% of the population — roughly 100,000 people — were addicted to heroin. The country had the highest rate of drug-related AIDS in the European Union. Open drug scenes in Lisbon's Casal Ventoso neighbourhood had become an international embarrassment. Needles littered the streets. People were dying in plain sight.[2]

The criminal justice approach had been tried for decades. It had failed completely. Portugal was spending enormous sums prosecuting and imprisoning drug users, and the problem was getting worse every year. Something had to change, and in 1998 the Portuguese government convened a commission of experts — doctors, psychologists, sociologists, legal scholars — to propose a new approach. Their recommendation was radical: treat drug use as a public health issue, not a criminal one.

The government listened. The parliament voted. The law passed. And the experiment began.

02 What Decriminalisation Actually Means

The single most important thing to understand about Portugal's drug policy is what it is not. It is not legalisation. This distinction is crucial, because every opponent of drug reform deliberately conflates the two in order to frighten the public.

Critical Distinction

Decriminalisation means that the act is still illegal, but it is no longer a criminal offence. It is treated as an administrative matter — like a traffic fine — rather than a criminal one. You don't get a criminal record. You don't go to prison. You don't lose your job or your passport.

Legalisation means the act is no longer illegal at all. The substance is regulated, taxed, and sold through licensed outlets — like alcohol or tobacco.

Portugal chose decriminalisation, not legalisation. Drugs are still illegal. Manufacturing and dealing are still serious crimes. The entire supply chain remains criminal. What changed is how the user is treated.

Under the Portuguese system, possession of any drug in an amount deemed to be for personal use — defined as roughly a 10-day supply — is not a criminal offence. If a police officer finds drugs on your person, they confiscate the drugs and issue a citation. You are then required to appear before a Comissão para a Dissuassão da Toxicodependência (CDT) — a Commission for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction — within 72 hours.[3]

The CDT is not a court. There is no judge. There is no prosecutor. There is no criminal record. The commission is composed of three members: a lawyer, a social worker, and a psychologist (or doctor). Their job is not to punish. Their job is to assess the person's relationship with drugs and to determine the most appropriate response.

The Threshold Amounts

Portuguese law defines personal use quantities for each substance. Possession above these amounts is still treated as a criminal offence (presumed dealing). The thresholds are approximately:

Substance Personal Use Threshold (10-day supply)
Cannabis (herb)25 grams
Cannabis (resin)5 grams
Cocaine2 grams
Heroin1 gram
MDMA1 gram
Amphetamines1 gram

These thresholds are guidelines, not hard limits. The CDT considers the totality of the circumstances. A person found with slightly more than the threshold amount is not automatically treated as a dealer — context, intent, and evidence of dealing activity all matter.

Contrast this with Ireland, where possession of any amount of cannabis is a criminal offence. Any amount. A single joint. A few flakes in a coat pocket. There is no threshold. There is no discretion built into the law. There is only criminalisation.

03 The Numbers: Before and After

Numbers do not lie. Politicians do. The data from 25 years of Portuguese decriminalisation tells a story so clear, so unambiguous, that to deny it requires either ignorance or dishonesty. Here are the facts.

Drug-Related Deaths

In 2001, the year decriminalisation took effect, Portugal recorded 80 drug-related deaths. By 2012, that number had fallen to 16. Sixteen. A reduction of 80%.[4] The figure has fluctuated since — as definitions and reporting methods have changed across Europe — but Portugal's drug-related death rate remains among the lowest in the European Union, consistently below the EU average.

Drug Deaths (2001)

80

Before decriminalisation took full effect

Drug Deaths (2012)

16

80% reduction in drug-related mortality

HIV Among Drug Users (2000)

52%

Of all new HIV diagnoses

HIV Among Drug Users (2015)

7%

Of all new HIV diagnoses

HIV and Hepatitis C

This is perhaps the most dramatic outcome. In 2000, before decriminalisation, 52% of all new HIV infections in Portugal were among people who inject drugs. By 2015, that figure had fallen to approximately 7%.[5] This was not a modest improvement. This was a transformation. It happened because decriminalisation removed the fear of prosecution that kept drug users away from health services, needle exchanges, and treatment programmes.

Hepatitis C followed a similar trajectory. When people are not afraid of being arrested, they engage with harm reduction services. They use clean needles. They get tested. They enter treatment. This is not complicated. It is basic public health logic that criminal prohibition made impossible.

Drug Use Rates

The prohibitionists' central prediction was that decriminalisation would cause drug use to skyrocket. It did not. Drug use rates in Portugal have remained stable or declined since 2001, fluctuating within normal ranges and tracking broadly in line with European trends.[4]

Key Finding

Portugal's drug use rates are below the European average for cannabis, cocaine, and MDMA. Decriminalisation did not increase drug use. The removal of criminal penalties did not cause a surge in consumption. This finding has been replicated and confirmed by every major study of the Portuguese model over 25 years.

Prison Population

Drug-related imprisonment in Portugal dropped by approximately 40% following decriminalisation.[2] This freed up prison capacity, reduced costs, and — most importantly — stopped turning drug users into convicted criminals. A criminal record is a life sentence of its own: it affects employment, housing, travel, insurance, relationships. Portugal decided that destroying someone's life prospects was not a proportionate response to a health issue. Ireland still hasn't.

04 What the Prohibitionists Predicted

Let us be precise about this. The opponents of decriminalisation did not express cautious concerns. They did not suggest potential risks that might need monitoring. They made bold, confident, categorical predictions about what would happen if Portugal stopped treating drug users as criminals. Every single one of those predictions was wrong.

Prediction 1: Drug use would skyrocket

Reality: Drug use rates remained stable or declined. Portugal's lifetime cannabis use rate remains below the EU average. The removal of criminal penalties did not cause a rush to the pharmacy. This makes intuitive sense — the threat of a criminal record has never been a primary factor in whether someone decides to use drugs. People don't sit at home thinking, “I'd love to try cocaine, but I'm worried about a conviction.” They either want to use drugs or they don't. The law is, at best, a marginal deterrent — and the evidence from Portugal proves it.[1]

Prediction 2: Portugal would become a drug tourism destination

Reality: It didn't. There was no measurable increase in drug tourism to Portugal following decriminalisation. The law applies only to Portuguese residents and people present in Portuguese territory — tourists found with drugs are still referred to CDTs, and non-residents can face expulsion. More fundamentally, nobody books a flight to Lisbon because they can possess two grams of cocaine without a criminal record. The drug tourism argument was always a fantasy designed to frighten people who don't think very hard about things.

Prediction 3: Organised crime would flourish

Reality: Organised crime was already flourishing under prohibition. That's the point. Criminal prohibition creates criminal markets. Decriminalisation did not affect the supply side — dealing and trafficking remained criminal offences with severe penalties. What decriminalisation did was redirect resources from prosecuting users to investigating suppliers. Portugal continued to pursue drug trafficking with the full force of its criminal justice system. The difference is that it stopped wasting police time, court time, and prison space on people whose only crime was possessing a substance for their own use.[3]

Prediction 4: Society would collapse

Reality: Portuguese society did not collapse. It improved. Health outcomes got better. Crime fell. The prison population dropped. Public health expenditure became more efficient. The only thing that collapsed was the credibility of the prohibitionist argument.

“Every prediction made by the opponents of Portugal's decriminalisation has been tested against 25 years of real-world data. Every prediction failed. At what point does being wrong about everything stop being an honest mistake and start being wilful denial?”

05 The Dissuasion Commissions

The CDT system is the operational heart of Portuguese decriminalisation, and it is worth understanding in detail, because it demonstrates what a health-led drug policy actually looks like in practice — not in theory, not in a policy document, but on the ground, in a room, with a real person sitting across the table.

How a CDT Hearing Works

When a person is found in possession of drugs within the personal use threshold, the police confiscate the drugs and issue a citation requiring the person to appear before their regional CDT within 72 hours. Portugal has 18 CDTs, one for each of the country's districts plus the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira.[3]

The hearing is not adversarial. There is no prosecution. The three-member panel — a lawyer, a social worker, and a psychologist — conducts what is essentially a clinical assessment. They ask questions about the person's drug use history, their social circumstances, their health, their employment, their family situation. The objective is to determine whether the person is a recreational user, a problematic user, or an addict — and to respond accordingly.

Possible Outcomes

  • Provisional suspension: For first-time offenders with no signs of problematic use, the case is typically suspended with no sanction at all. The person is given information about drug risks and available services, and sent home. If they don't reappear before a CDT within a set period, the case is closed permanently.
  • Sanctions: For repeat offenders or problematic users, the CDT can impose administrative sanctions. These include fines (scaled to income), community service, suspension of professional licences, bans from certain locations, or mandatory reporting to services. These are administrative sanctions — not criminal penalties. They do not result in a criminal record.
  • Treatment referral: For users identified as addicts or at serious risk, the CDT can refer them to treatment services. Critically, treatment is offered, not forced. Compulsory treatment is possible in theory under Portuguese law but is almost never imposed in practice.

Key Principle

The CDT system is built on a single foundational principle: a criminal record is never an appropriate response to drug use. Whatever the circumstances, whatever the substance, however many times a person appears before a CDT, they will never receive a criminal conviction for possession for personal use. Never. This is the principle that Ireland refuses to adopt.

The data on CDT outcomes shows the system working as intended. The majority of first-time appearances result in provisional suspension — essentially a conversation, some information, and a second chance. Repeat appearances result in progressively firmer interventions. But at no point does the system brand a person with a criminal record that will follow them for life.

Compare this with Ireland, where a 19-year-old found with a single joint receives a criminal conviction that will appear on Garda vetting checks for employment, will be required to be disclosed on visa applications, and will hang around their neck for decades. For a joint. In 2026.

06 The Health Outcomes

If decriminalisation were judged solely on its public health outcomes, it would be considered one of the most successful policy interventions in modern European history. The transformation in Portugal's drug-related health metrics over 25 years is not incremental. It is dramatic.

HIV Infections

The collapse in HIV transmission among people who inject drugs is the single most compelling piece of evidence in favour of the Portuguese model. In 2000, new HIV diagnoses related to injecting drug use numbered over 1,000 per year. By the mid-2010s, that number had fallen to fewer than 30.[5]

The mechanism is straightforward. Under criminalisation, people who inject drugs avoid health services because engaging with those services risks exposure to law enforcement. They share needles because accessing clean ones requires interacting with systems they don't trust. They don't get tested because a positive diagnosis in a criminalised context creates additional layers of vulnerability. Remove the criminal penalty, and the barrier to engagement falls away. People come forward. They access needle exchanges. They get tested. They enter treatment. They stop sharing needles. HIV transmission falls.

This is not theory. This is documented, measured, peer-reviewed reality.[1]

Overdose Deaths

The reduction in drug-related deaths from 80 in 2001 to 16 in 2012 was not an accident. It was the direct result of increased engagement with health services, expanded harm reduction programmes, wider availability of opioid substitution treatment, and the removal of the fear that kept people from seeking help before it was too late.[4]

People die from overdoses not because drugs are dangerous — though they are — but because criminalisation creates the conditions in which overdoses are more likely and less survivable. Users consume in hidden, unsupervised settings. They don't call ambulances because they fear arrest. They don't know the strength or composition of what they're taking because the market is unregulated. They don't have access to naloxone or other life-saving interventions. Decriminalisation addresses every one of these factors.

Treatment Uptake

The number of people in drug treatment in Portugal increased substantially following decriminalisation. Not because treatment was forced on them, but because they were no longer afraid to ask for it. This is the most fundamental insight of the Portuguese model: criminal penalties do not reduce drug use, but they do reduce treatment uptake. Removing criminal penalties does not increase drug use, but it does increase treatment uptake. The maths is simple. The policy implication is obvious. And yet Ireland persists with a system that actively discourages the most vulnerable people in society from seeking help.[2]

“The Portuguese proved something that should have been obvious from the start: if you treat drug users as patients instead of criminals, they behave like patients instead of criminals. They show up. They engage. They get better.”

Hepatitis C

New Hepatitis C infections among people who inject drugs followed the same downward trajectory as HIV. Expanded access to needle exchange programmes, drug consumption rooms, and health services — all facilitated by the removal of criminal penalties — reduced transmission rates significantly. Portugal's investment in harm reduction infrastructure, made possible by the savings from not prosecuting users, created a public health system that met people where they were rather than waiting for them to hit rock bottom and present at an emergency department.[5]

07 What Portugal Spends vs What Ireland Spends

Follow the money. It tells you everything you need to know about a country's real priorities.

When Portugal decriminalised drugs, it didn't just change the law. It fundamentally redirected public spending. Money that had been spent on arresting, prosecuting, and imprisoning drug users was reallocated to health services, treatment programmes, harm reduction, and social reintegration. This wasn't charity. It was economics. Treating a drug user in the health system costs a fraction of what it costs to process them through the criminal justice system.

The Economics

The cost of processing a single drug possession case through the Irish criminal justice system — from Garda time, to court time, to legal aid, to potential imprisonment — vastly exceeds the cost of a CDT hearing and a treatment referral in Portugal. Portugal chose the cheaper option that also happens to be the more humane option and the more effective option. Ireland chose the expensive, cruel, and ineffective option.

Ireland's Costly Prohibition

Ireland spends millions every year prosecuting drug possession for personal use. Consider what that involves:

  • Garda time: Every possession arrest involves officer time for the stop, the search, the seizure, the paperwork, the evidence handling, and the court appearance. For a joint.
  • Court time: District Courts across Ireland spend countless hours processing simple possession charges. Judges, registrars, clerks, security — all paid by the taxpayer to adjudicate whether a young person had a small bag of dried plant material.
  • Legal aid: Many defendants in drug possession cases qualify for legal aid. The state pays for a solicitor to defend a person against a charge that Portugal stopped bringing 25 years ago.
  • Prison costs: Where custodial sentences are imposed — and they are, for repeat offenders — the cost is approximately €80,000 per prisoner per year in Ireland. To house someone who possessed drugs for personal use.

Portugal's Health-Led Investment

Portugal redirected those resources into:

  • CDT operations: 18 commissions across the country, staffed by trained professionals. Low overhead, high throughput, effective triage.
  • Treatment services: Expanded opioid substitution therapy, residential rehabilitation, outpatient programmes.
  • Harm reduction: Needle exchanges, drug consumption rooms, naloxone distribution, outreach services.
  • Social reintegration: Housing support, employment assistance, family services — addressing the root causes that drive problematic drug use.

The result: better health outcomes, lower drug-related deaths, lower HIV transmission, lower imprisonment rates, and a drug use rate that is below the European average. All for less money than Ireland spends achieving the opposite.

Ireland

€80k

Approx. cost per prisoner per year in the Irish prison system

Portugal

CDT

Health assessment, referral, and follow-up at a fraction of the cost

08 The Irish Comparison

Portugal and Ireland are not identical countries, but they are comparable ones. Portugal has a population of roughly 10 million. Ireland has roughly 5 million. Both are small, peripheral European nations with Catholic cultural histories, relatively recent experiences of poverty and emigration, and EU membership. The comparison is not perfect, but it is legitimate — far more legitimate than the excuses Irish politicians use to avoid making it.

Ireland: Criminalisation in Numbers

Every year in Ireland, thousands of people are prosecuted for drug possession for personal use. The vast majority of these prosecutions are for cannabis. The Courts Service annual reports show a consistent pattern:[4]

  • Thousands of Section 3 charges (simple possession) processed through the District Court annually
  • Cannabis accounts for the overwhelming majority of drug possession prosecutions
  • Young men aged 18–30 are disproportionately represented
  • Criminal convictions issued for first, second, and subsequent offences
  • No measurable impact on drug use rates over decades of enforcement

These are real people. Real criminal records. Real consequences for employment, travel, relationships, and mental health. And for what? Drug use rates in Ireland have not declined as a result of criminalisation. They have tracked broadly in line with European trends — exactly as they have in Portugal, where nobody gets a criminal record for possession.

Portugal: Decriminalisation in Numbers

  • Zero criminal records issued for drug possession for personal use since 2001
  • Drug use rates below the European average
  • Drug-related deaths among the lowest in the EU
  • HIV infections among drug users reduced by over 85%
  • Prison population for drug offences reduced by approximately 40%
  • Treatment uptake significantly increased
Metric Ireland Portugal
Criminal records for possession Thousands per year Zero
Drug-related death rate Above EU average Among lowest in EU
Approach to users Criminal prosecution Health assessment (CDT)
Impact on drug use rates No measurable reduction Stable / below EU average
HIV among drug users Ongoing concern Reduced by 85%+
Treatment uptake Hindered by criminalisation Significantly increased

The table tells the story. Ireland criminalises and gets worse outcomes. Portugal doesn't criminalise and gets better outcomes. The two approaches have been running in parallel for 25 years. The evidence is not ambiguous. It is not contested by any serious researcher. It is simply ignored by Irish policymakers.

“Ireland and Portugal started from similar places. Portugal chose evidence. Ireland chose ideology. Twenty-five years later, the results speak for themselves.”

09 Why Ireland Won't Copy Portugal

If the evidence is this clear — and it is — why hasn't Ireland adopted the Portuguese model? The question answers itself once you understand that drug policy in Ireland has never been about evidence. It is about politics, cowardice, and vested interests.

Political Cowardice

No major Irish political party has committed to decriminalisation. Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, and Sinn Féin all pay lip service to “health-led approaches” while maintaining the criminal framework that makes health-led approaches impossible. They know the evidence. Their own Citizens' Assembly told them what to do. They choose not to do it because they are afraid of tabloid headlines, afraid of opposition attack ads, afraid of being called “soft on drugs” by people who don't understand the issue and don't want to.

This is the definition of political cowardice: knowing what is right, knowing what works, and refusing to act because it might cost votes. Irish politicians would rather destroy the lives of thousands of young people with criminal records than risk a negative headline in the Sunday World.

The Alcohol Lobby

Ireland has a powerful alcohol industry that has consistently lobbied against drug policy reform. The logic is simple: if cannabis is decriminalised or legalised, it competes with alcohol. The alcohol industry has enormous influence in Irish politics — through lobbying, through advertising revenue, through political donations, and through the cultural normalisation of alcohol that permeates Irish public life. The industry has no interest in a rational, evidence-based conversation about relative drug harms, because that conversation would inevitably highlight that alcohol is more harmful than most illegal drugs — and that Ireland's tolerance of alcohol while criminalising cannabis is scientifically indefensible.

The "Tough on Crime" Narrative

Being “tough on crime” is politically profitable in Ireland, even when toughness is demonstrably ineffective. Criminalising drug users feels like doing something, even though it achieves nothing. Decriminalisation feels like doing nothing, even though it achieves everything. Irish political culture rewards the appearance of action over the reality of outcomes. It is easier to announce a Garda drugs operation than to explain why a health-led approach produces better results.

The Citizens' Assembly Betrayal

In 2023, Ireland's Citizens' Assembly on Drug Use heard extensive evidence and recommended decisively that drug possession for personal use should be decriminalised. The government received the report. It acknowledged the recommendations. It established a working group. And then — nothing. The recommendations have not been implemented. No legislation has been introduced. No timeline has been set. The government used the Citizens' Assembly as a mechanism for appearing to care about drug policy while having absolutely no intention of changing it.

The Democratic Deficit

Citizens' Assemblies are expensive, time-consuming, and democratically significant exercises. Ireland has now held assemblies on marriage equality, abortion, and drug use. On the first two, the government acted. On drug use, it has not. The message is clear: citizens' assemblies are respected when their conclusions are politically convenient, and ignored when they are not.

Portugal had the same political fears in 2000. Its politicians were afraid too. The difference is that Portugal's political class looked at the evidence, looked at the crisis, and decided that doing the right thing was more important than doing the safe thing. Ireland's political class has never had that courage. And every year they delay, more people get criminal records, more people avoid treatment, and more people die.

10 25 Years of Evidence

In 2001, Portugal's decriminalisation was an experiment. In 2026, it is not. It is a 25-year-old evidence base that has been studied, peer-reviewed, replicated in analysis, and confirmed by every credible institution that has examined it. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EUDA, formerly EMCDDA), the World Health Organisation, the Global Commission on Drug Policy, the CATO Institute, the British Journal of Criminology, and dozens of independent researchers have all reached the same conclusion: Portugal's decriminalisation works.[1][2][3]

Let us be clear about what 25 years of data has established:

  • Decriminalisation does not increase drug use. This has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt. Drug use rates in Portugal have remained stable or declined, and are below the European average for most substances.
  • Decriminalisation dramatically improves health outcomes. HIV infections, Hepatitis C, and overdose deaths all fell significantly. Treatment uptake increased. People who were dying under prohibition started living under decriminalisation.
  • Decriminalisation reduces the burden on criminal justice. Prison populations fell. Court time was freed up. Police resources were redirected to serious crime. The entire justice system became more efficient.
  • Decriminalisation does not lead to drug tourism. This was a fantasy. It has been comprehensively disproven.
  • Decriminalisation does not empower organised crime. The supply side remains fully criminal. Trafficking and dealing are still prosecuted. The only change is that users are treated as patients rather than offenders.
  • Decriminalisation saves money. Health-led responses cost less than criminal justice responses and produce better outcomes. This is fiscal responsibility, not weakness.
“After 25 years, calling Portugal's decriminalisation an 'experiment' is like calling gravity a 'theory.' The evidence is in. The debate is over. The only question is why countries like Ireland refuse to act on what they already know.”

Every objection to decriminalisation has been tested against a quarter of a century of real-world data and found wanting. Every prediction of catastrophe has been falsified. Every alternative explanation has been investigated and dismissed. What remains is a body of evidence so overwhelming that to ignore it is not cautious policymaking — it is negligence.

Ireland has no excuse left. It has the evidence from Portugal. It has the recommendation of its own Citizens' Assembly. It has the data from its own failing criminal justice approach. It has the comparison with countries that have reformed and seen better outcomes. It has everything it needs except political courage.

Portugal's experiment is over. The results are in. They have been in for years. Every day that Ireland continues to criminalise drug possession for personal use is a day that it chooses ideology over evidence, punishment over health, and political cowardice over the welfare of its citizens.

The Portuguese model is not perfect. No policy is. There are legitimate criticisms about funding levels, about regional variation in CDT practice, about the limitations of decriminalisation without full legalisation and regulation of supply. But these are criticisms about how to improve a successful policy, not arguments for returning to a failed one. The question for Ireland is not whether Portugal got everything right. The question is whether Ireland can justify doing nothing when 25 years of evidence tells it that what it is currently doing is wrong.

It cannot. And deep down, every politician in Leinster House knows it.

What Kind of Drug Policy Would You Choose?

The Social Contract lets you design your own society — including drug policy. See how your choices compare.

Sources & Notes

  1. Hughes, C.E. and Stevens, A. “What Can We Learn from the Portuguese Decriminalization of Illicit Drugs?” British Journal of Criminology, 50(6), 999–1022 (2010). doi:10.1093/bjc/azq038. The foundational peer-reviewed study of Portugal's decriminalisation outcomes.
  2. Greenwald, Glenn. Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies. CATO Institute White Paper (2009). Available at: cato.org
  3. Portuguese Institute for Drugs and Drug Addiction (SICAD), Annual Reports on Drug Use and Drug-Related Issues. SICAD publishes annual data on CDT operations, treatment uptake, and drug use trends. Available at: sicad.pt
  4. European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EUDA, formerly EMCDDA), Portugal Country Drug Report (annual). Statistical data on drug-related deaths, prevalence, treatment demand, and drug law offences. Available at: euda.europa.eu/countries/portugal
  5. European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EUDA), Statistical Bulletin — HIV and Hepatitis C data among people who inject drugs. Available at: euda.europa.eu. See also: ECDC/EMCDDA joint reports on HIV and injecting drug use.

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